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Abstract 
There exists divergence of opinions in the literature on the impact of audit committee on earnings management. 
The mixed opinions make the direction of the impact ambiguous. This study therefore investigates the impact of 
audit committee on Earnings Management of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. Earnings management was 
measured using Chang, Yat-sen, Shen and Fang (2008) Discretionary Loan Loss Provision Model. The study 
adopts correlational research design of which secondary data were extracted from the 13 sampled deposit money 
banks listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period 2008-2017. The study employed Random Effects 
Model (REM) to analyze the data. The results revealed that audit committee financial expertise and audit 
committee busyness have negative significant impact on earnings management, audit committee tenure has a 
negative insignificant impact on earnings management. Audit committee meeting and audit committee share 
ownership have positive insignificant impact on earnings management. The study concludes that audit committee 
expertise and busyness improve the quality of financial report of deposit money banks in Nigeria. The study 
recommends among others that the board should ensure that members with financial expertise are appointed into 
audit committee as it enhances the earnings management of the banks. The inclusion of more directors with 
multiple directors on the audit committee as their wealth of experience helps in reducing earnings management 
thus improving the earnings management of the banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Audit Committee (AC) is an essential element of corporate governance that can enhance the quality of financial 
reporting through an open and candid communication of financial and non-financial information and a good 
working relationship with a company's board of directors, internal auditors and external auditors.  
Undeniably, the existence of an appropriately constituted audit committee is now a necessity for all listed 
companies in the United Kingdom and United States of America and same in Nigeria (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; 
The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010 and Nigeria SEC Code, 2011). In Nigeria, the creation and 
establishment of an audit committee is made mandatory by the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 
2004. Section 359 (3) states that "The auditor shall in the case of a public company also make a report to an audit 
committee which shall be established by the public company". According to CAMA, Section 359 (4), the makeup 
of the audit committee shall consist of an equal number of directors and representatives of the shareholders of the 
company (subject to a maximum number of six members)".  
The primary objective of financial reporting is to provide high-quality financial reporting information 
concerning economic entities, primarily financial in nature, useful for economic decision making in an 
organizational set up. Providing high quality financial reporting information is important because it will positively 
influence capital providers and other stakeholders in making investment, credit, and similar resources allocation 
decisions that will enhance the overall market efficiency. The accounting scandals of the early 2000s, clearly 
demonstrate the importance of quality of financial reporting to investors and other stakeholders. However, the 
interpretation of quality of financial reporting remains problematic due to different financial reporting 
environments, regulations, procedures, and understandings. One good aspect of quality issues in financial 
accounting is from the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), which identifies six (6) qualitative 
characteristics of both fundamental and enhancing characteristics viewed as desirable for the fulfillment of their 
fundamental objective of communicating decision-useful measurements: relevance, faithful representation, 
understandability, comparability, verifiability, and timeliness.  
Despite the 2003 and subsequent revised code of corporate governance issued by Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) that has been enacted to establish effective audit committees with the required quality and 
characteristics in the Public Companies in Nigeria as well as clear duties and responsibilities for effective financial 
reporting and accountability, there have been reported cases of Corporate failures in Nigeria that have raised great 
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concern in the development of corporate businesses. In the banking sector alone, 45 banks were liquidated in 
between 1994 to 2006, while in 2007, 14 banks were liquidated. In 2009, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
sacked the managing directors and Chief Executives Officers (CEOs) of five commercial banks along with their 
executive directors. On October 2, 2009, the Central Bank of Nigeria announced an additional sack of three bank 
CEOs and their respective board of directors all due to excessive high level of non-performing loans, which was 
attributable to poor corporate governance mechanism, lack of credit administration process, the unethical practices 
by the management and the bank credit risk management practices (Economic Confidential, 2009). As of these 
and other scandals recorded in Nigeria in recent times, international organizations, financial regulatory authorities 
and academicians became much concerned about corporate governance issues in Nigeria ( Madawaki & Noor, 
2013). These issues brought doubt in the minds of shareholders on the credibility and reliability of earnings 
management (Bala & Gugong, 2015). 
It is considered as failures of audit committee in discharging their duties and functions accordingly and that 
impressed researchers to consider it of paramount importance to examine the impact of audit committee on 
earnings management but documented mixed results. For example, Eriabie et al. (2016), Muhammad, Ayoib and 
Noor (2016) and Adeyemo, Eriebie, Adetiloye and Ben-Caleb (2015) reported positive relationships. While others 
found negative associations (Koholga, Babangida & Monica, 2015). Other researchers reported weak relationship 
(Madawaki & Noor, 2013). More so, in Nigeria, studies in this area mostly have ignored the instance of audit 
committee busyness variable which means the issue of holding multiple directorships not only remains a major 
concern for governance regulators but also remains a focus of research attention. Additionally, the time period 
covered by some of the previous studies leaves a gap to fill. The works of Mbobo and Adebimpe (2016) for 
instance, covered the period from 2006 to 2013. Sylvester et al. (2016) covered the period of 2006 to 2012 and 
Onyabe, Okpanachi, Nyor, Yahaya, and Ahmed (2018), covered the period of 2007 to 2016 and we are expanding 
it to year 2017. 
Therefore, this study is empirically investigates the impact of audit committee on Earnings  Management of 
listed money deposit banks in Nigeria and hypothesized that audit committee characteristics does not have 
significant impact on Earnings  Management of listed Nigerian deposit money banks. The hypotheses for this study 
are stated in null forms as follows: 
H01: Audit committee financial expertise has no significance effect on financial reporting quality of listed deposit 
money banks in Nigeria.   
H02: Audit committee meeting has no significance effect on financial reporting quality of listed deposit money 
banks in Nigeria. 
H03: Audit committee tenure has no significance effect on financial reporting quality of listed deposit money banks 
in Nigeria. 
H04: Audit committee share ownership has no significance effect on financial reporting quality of listed deposit 
money deposit banks in Nigeria. 
H05: Audit committee busyness has no significance effect on financial reporting quality of listed deposit money 
banks in Nigeria. 
The study rests on its expected practical implications. On the practical implication, the study will produce 
reliable empirical evidence that will encourage Nigerian Banks to be attuned with the global paradigm shift from 
tangible resources and with audit committee characteristics, it is anticipated that this will enhance the competitive 
states of Nigerian Banks in the global market where auditing has been made compulsory for corporate entities. 
The study could also be beneficial in providing them with (corporate management) useful insight as they seek to 
take advantage of corporate reporting in increasing their productivity, profitability, investment and business 
growth. This study is also contributed to the literature on audit committee and earnings management and regulators 
of Nigeria capital market in increasing the effectiveness of the audit committee listing rules. The study covers the 
period of ten (10) years from 2008 to 2017. The population of the study is entire listed Nigerian deposit money 
banks. To accomplish this study, the paper is divided into five sections namely: section one is the Introduction, 
section two takes up the literature review, section three presents the methodology, section four deals with results 
and discussions and section five conclude the study. 
 
2.Literature Review 
The audit committee performs an important  role in the financial monitoring of a firm. First, according to Blue 
Ribbon Committee 1999; Bill 2006, audit committee members maintain responsibility for oversight over 
accounting policies and judgments, as well as the quality of the overall financial statements. Furthermore, the audit 
committee is normally accountable for selecting outside auditors, and meeting with financial managers to measure 
whether they are acting in the firm's best interest (Klein 2002b). DeFond et al. (2005) suggests that these 
responsibilities often require notable accounting complexity in that they involve evaluating the reasonableness of 
complex financial matters such as the company's accounting reserves, and management's handling of proposed 
audit adjustments suggested by the external auditors. The conceptual framework is presented in figure 1  
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/RJFA 
Vol.10, No.16, 2019 
 
117 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
(Umobong & Ibanichuka, 2017) 
There are different definitions of quality of financial reporting. Some of the seven qualitative characteristics 
quality issues in financial accounting viewed as desirable for the fulfillment of their fundamental objective of 
communicating decision-useful measurements include relevance, understandability, reliability, completeness, 
objectivity, comparability, and timeliness (Honu & Gajevszky, 2014). In financial accounting, earnings 
management may be judged from a number of proxies such as earnings persistence, predictability of future 
performance, earnings variability, and relation between cash, accruals and income (Bushman & Piotroski, 2006). 
Li, (2010) found that accounting standards are the major determinant of earnings management among other 
institutional factors. In order to have high quality financial reporting the accounting standards must first be of high 
quality.  
Van Beest, Braam and Boelens (2009) on their part posited that since different user groups will have 
dissimilar preferences, perceived quality will deviate among constituents. In addition, the users within a user group 
may also perceive the usefulness of similar information differently given its context. As a result of this context 
and user-specificity, measuring quality directly seems problematic. Consequently, many researchers measure the 
quality of financial reporting indirectly by focusing on attributes that are believed to influence quality of financial 
reports, such as earnings management, financial restatements, and timeliness (Barth et al., 2008).  
In 2002, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) showed their commitment towards developing a common set of high-quality accounting standards, which 
could be used worldwide. As a consequence of the joint project to converge the more principles-based International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) and the more rules-based US General Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP), 
both boards agreed to develop new joint conceptual framework, which includes the objectives of financial 
reporting and the underlying qualitative characteristics on which accounting standards ought to be based. In 
October 2010, the FASB and the IASB therefore published an exposure draft of an improved Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting (IASB, 2010). Some of the measure contained in the conceptual framework 
included relevance, faithful representation, verifiability, understandability, comparability and timeliness. 
Another major characteristic of audit committees is expertise. There are three main classes of expertise of 
audit committees: outside directorship (Beasley 1996; Vafeas 2005); financial and accounting expertise (Abbott 
et al. 2004; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008); and industry expertise (Cohen et al. 2014).     
Onyabe, Okpanachi, Nyor, Yahaya, and Ahmed (2018) in their study discovered and concluded that audit 
committee expertise has an insignificant impact the Financial Reporting Quality. Kusnadi, Leong Suwardy, and 
Wang (2014) opined that financial expertise improve the Financial Reporting Quality through their professional 
knowledge. The appointment of audit committee members with financial and accounting expertise can lead to 
significant positive market reaction (Davidson III et al. 2004; DeFond et al. 2005). For example, DeFond et al. 
(2005) discover positive abnormal returns when a financial and accounting expert is assigned to the audit 
committee. It is expected that the audit committee members’ skills play a vital role in the way that they carry out 
their duties (Kalbers and Fogarty 1993). Knapp (1987) found that auditors might reduce the audit committee’s 
oversight role if they believe that the audit committee does not have the necessary knowledge to understand 
technical auditing and financial reporting matters.  
Stewart and Munro (2007) concentrated on the results of the number of times of meetings of the audit 
committee. They determined that the presence of an audit committee, the number of its meetings and the auditor’s 
attendance for such meetings decreases audit risks, and that the external auditor accepts that the presence of an 
Audit Committee Expertise 
 
Audit Committee Meetings 
Audit Committee Tenure 
 
Earnings Management 
Audit Committee Share 
Ownership  
Audit Committee Busyness 
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audit committee is a vital element in reducing substantial risks of auditing. They further ascertained that reducing 
such risks is also affected by frequent meetings of the audit committee and auditor's attendance of such meetings. 
Osarumwense and Aderemi (2016) suggest that the frequency of meetings affects the quality of financial reporting. 
Zhang and Zhou (2007) used the number of meetings to measure whether the frequency affects quality of financial 
reporting. Inactive audit committees with less number of meetings were found to be unlikely to supervise 
management effectively. The study further discovered that fraudulent firms with earnings misstatements have 
fewer audit committee meetings than non-fraud firms. Ruzaidah and Takiah (2004) discover that good reporting 
companies meet more often than the poor reporting companies. The more frequent audit committees meet, the 
better the quality of financial reporting because they can oversee the management activities quickly and efficiently 
in the meeting (Ruzaidah & Takiah, 2004). However, Onyabe, Okpanachi, Nyor, Yahaya, and Ahmed (2018) 
examines the effect audit committee meeting and expertise on Earnings  Management of listed deposit money 
banks (DMB’s) in Nigeria and discovered that the numbers of audit committee meeting does not affect Financial 
Reporting Quality. 
Page and Spira (2005) examine the tenure of audit committee directors on the board which is another 
important element in ascertaining the effectiveness of audit committees in carrying out their monitoring function. 
Vafeas (2005) disagrees that longer board service might compromise audit committee directors’ independence by 
bringing directors and management closer resulting in directors ‘befriending’ management. Vafeas (2005) records 
a positive association between the mean tenure of audit committee members and poor earning quality measure, 
showing an inverse relationship between the average tenure and earnings quality. Boone, Khurana and Raman 
(2008) find some evidence for a non-linear relationship between auditor committee tenure of Big 5 audits and 
financial reporting credibility by using the ex-ante equity risk premium. Their results show that the equity risk 
premium decreases in the early years of an auditor-client relationship and increases with each additional year past 
13 years of auditor tenure. Onyabe, Okpanachi, Nyor, Yahaya & Ahmed (2018), carry out study on Effect of Audit 
Committee Tenure on Financial Reporting Quality of Listed Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria confirmed that audit 
committee tenure does not influence on earnings management. 
Audit Committee share ownership represents the audit committee member proportion of shareholdings in the 
company. The effectiveness of audit committee members’ share ownership on the monitoring of the financial 
reporting process has been recorded by many studies. The empirical facts show there is a potential relationship 
between share ownership and the effectiveness of the financial reporting process. Forker, 1992; Lavelle, 2002, 
argued that independence of audit committee members with high portion of shareholdings can be questioned as 
they may seek greater levels of control in the operations of the firm in order to protect their investments. Carcello 
and Neal (2003) found that in firms where audit committee members' share ownership was high, audit committee 
members may apply undue power to discharge an external auditor after issuing a going concern report to protect 
their vested interest. 
Alternatively, it has been implied that share ownership can result in greater alertness by audit committee 
members, as they have more of a stake in ensuring the company carries out its functions efficiently (Jensen, 1989; 
Shivdasani, 1993). Thus, a high shareholding by audit committee members (as NEDs) can actually help improve 
the financial reporting process by motivating them to monitor more effectively. Directors that have more 
shareholding will be motivated to monitor and instigate management reporting (Jensen, 1993). Jensen (1993) 
argues this incentive is usually higher for corporate directors compared to short-term investors as they probably 
have a long-term orientation. 
The issue of holding multiple directorships not only remains a significant interest for  governance regulators 
but also remains a focus of research attention, stretching from the empirical evidence on the determinants of 
multiple directorships (O’Sullivan, 2005;  O’Sullivan, 2009) to the effect of such directors on various financial 
matters (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). A common opinion among policy advocates is that serving on many boards 
can result in overworked directors that may not be effective monitors on any board. In the UK, the Combined Code 
(2003) recommends that ‘executives should be discouraged from holding more than one non-executive 
directorship in another listed company’. Fama and Jenson (1983) maintain that the reputation of directors as 
monitoring expert are certainly related with additional directorships, thus showing that busy directors may be more 
able directors than their counterparts. A number of studies show the importance connected with holding additional 
directorships (Shivdasani, 1993; Ferris et al., 2003; Carcello et al., 2002b; Bedard et al., 2004; Yang and Krishnan, 
2005). 
This study has adopted the agency theory in explaining the relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and earnings management of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. Audit committees act for the 
concerns of shareholders and therefore a suitable functioning audit committee has a major function in preventing 
agency conflicts that may arise between shareholders and management. According to agency theory, earnings 
management will be realized when conflicting interests are solved in good time a role that can be effectively played 
by the audit committees. 
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3. Methodology 
For the purpose of study, correlational research design was adopted. The population of this study covers all the 
fourteen (14) banks listed on the floor of Nigerian Stock Exchange as at December 2017. Census sampling 
techniques was adopted and Sky Bank Nig. Plc was dropped out due to the inability to publish their annual reports 
and accounts for 2016 and 2017 and subsequently, the bank was taking over by Polaris bank in last quarter of 2018. 
Tables 1 contain the names of banks that make up the population and sample size of the study. 
Table 1 
List of listed Banks in the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 2017 
S/NO Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria Population Sample 
Size 
Year of 
Incorporation 
Year of Listing 
on NSE 
1 Access Bank Nig. Plc √ √ 1989 1998 
2 Diamond Bank Nig. Plc √ √ 1990 2005 
3 Fidelity Bank Nig. Plc √ √ 1987 1999 
4 First Bank Holding √ √ 1969 1971 
5 First City Monument Bank Nig. Plc √ √ 1982 2004 
6 Guaranty Trust Bank Nig. Plc √ √ 1990 1996 
7 Sky Bank Nig. Plc √  1990 2006 
8 Stanbic IBTC Bank Nig. Limited √ √ 1999 2005 
9 Sterling Bank Nig. Plc √ √ 1969 1992 
10 Union Bank of Nig. Plc √ √ 1968 1971 
11 United Bank for Africa Nig. Plc √ √ 1967 1971 
12 Unity Bank Nig. Plc √ √ 1987 2005 
13 Wema Bank Nig. Plc √ √ 1945 1991 
14 Zenith Bank Nig. Plc √ √ 1990 2004 
Source: Compiled from NSE Fact Book, 2017. 
The study will make use of multiple correlation model to determine the impact of audit committee 
characteristics on earnings management of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. In line with the research 
paradigm underpinning this study and consistent with the objectives of this study, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
model was employed as follows: 
EMit = β0 + β1ACFEXPit   + β2ACMEETit  + β3ACTEit + β4ACSOWit + β5BUSYit + eit 
Where: 
EM = measured by Discretionary loan loss provision 
ACFEXP = Audit Committee Expertise 
ACMEET = Audit Committee Meetings 
ACTEN = Audit Committee Tenure 
ACSOW = Audit Committee Share Ownership 
ACBUSY = Audit Committee Busyness 
εit= Error term 
β0= is the intercept 
β1 – β5= are the parameters to be estimated in the equation 
EM = earnings management, measured using the residuals from discretionary loan loss provision model based by 
Chang, Shen and Fang (2008) used by Farouk and Isa (2018) etc.  
The choice of the model of discretionary loan loss provision is that it was specifically built for financial sector 
(Chang et al. 2008). The model is shown below: 
LLP/Tat-1it = α0 1/TAit - 1 + α1 LCOit/TAit - 1 + α2 BBALit/TAit - 1 + ɛit 
Where 
 DLLPit = ɛit = LLPit – (α0 1/TAit – 1 + α1 LCOit/TAit - 1 + α2 BBALit/TAit – 1) 
Where: LLP = Loan Loss Provision for firm i at time t. 
LCO = the Loan Charge-offs for firm i at time t. 
BBAL = the beginning balance of LLP for firm i at time t. 
TA = the beginning total asset of firm i at time t. 
e = the error term 
= the intercept 
This variables used in this study are the dependent variable which is earnings management and the 
independent uses a number of variables to proxy for audit committee characteristics. (i.e. Meetings, financial 
expertise, tenure, effectiveness, busyness and share ownership) the main dependent and independent variables of 
interest and their measurement constructs are presented in table 2 below. 
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Table 2 
Operationalization of variables 
S/N VARIABLES DEFINITION TYPE MEASUREMENT AUTHORS 
1 FRQ Earnings  
Management 
Dependent Discretionary loan loss 
provision  
Chang et 
al.(2009) 
2 ACFEXP Audit Committee 
Financial 
Expertise 
Independent Proportion of audit committee 
members with accounting or 
financial qualification 
Madawaki & 
Amran (2017) 
3 ACMEET Audit Committee 
Meetings 
Independent Number of times the audit 
committee meetings held 
during the year 
Madawaki & 
Amran (2017) 
4 ACTE Audit Committee 
Tenure 
Independent  Audit committee members 
with  above 3 years as a 
member  
Ghafran C. 
(2013) 
5 ACSOW Audit Committee 
Share Ownership 
Independent Proportional share of non-
executive 
members on audit committee 
/total company shareholdings 
Kibiya, Ahmad 
& Amran 
(2016) 
6 ACBUSY 
                  
Audit Committee 
Busyness 
Independent 
 
members with  more than one 
directorship  
Ghafran C. 
(2013) 
Source: Compiled from literature  
The study used secondary data only to examine the impact of audit committee characteristics on earnings 
management of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. In this regard, the sources of data for the study will be the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) Fact Books for 2008 – 2017 and the annual reports and accounts of the banks for 
all the years covered by the study. Ordinary least square regression was adopted to empirically run the regress 
using STATA as tool of analysis. STATA was used because the study extracts the residual with it. The study uses 
correlation in order to determine the relationships between the variables of the study. Regression is employed 
because the study wants to determine the cause and effect of each variable. And finally, the study conducted 
robustness tests like, Hausman test and Heteroscedasticity test and Multi-collinearity test in order to improve the 
validity of statistical inferences.To ensure that the data for this is fit for the model, the study will conducts data 
normality test as well as a test for multi-collinearity and heteroscedasticity among explanatory variables. Other 
test will include: Diagnostic tests and test of hypotheses. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
The summary statistics of the explained and the explanatory variables are presented in Table 3 where minimum, 
maximum, mean and standard deviation of the data collected for the variables in the study are described. 
Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variables OBS MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX 
FRQ 130 .03 03 -.001 .20 
ACFEXP 130 .27 .14 .17 0.67 
ACMEET 130 4.3 1.20 1 7 
ACTE 130 .53 .50 0 1 
ACSOW 130 .04  .12 0 .24 
ACBUSY 130 .71 .45 0 1 
Source: Descriptive Statistics Result using STATA 13 
Table 3 shows the detail account of the descriptive statistics for the explained and explanatory variables. 
Discretionary loan loss provision which is the dependent variable of the study has a minimum value of -.001 and 
a maximum value of .20. The average value of the DLLP is 03 with standard deviation of 03 which suggests that 
there is a low disparity in the way in which the sampled banks managed their earnings. 
The table also shows that the mean value for audit committee expertise is .271 and the standard deviation 
is .14. This shows that on average, 27.1% of the audit committee members are financial expertise and these pattern 
is similar in the sampled banks evidence from the standard deviation value. The least and the highest value is 0.17 
and 0.67. The summary statistics from the table with respect to audit committee meeting, the average value of 
ACMEET is 4.3 with a standard deviation of 1.20. The average of 4.3 signifies on average the audit committee 
holds meetings for more than 4 times. The standard deviation shows that there is low variation of the variable from 
the mean. It further shows that the attendance to meeting across the sampled banks follows similar pattern. The 
table also indicates that the minimum and maximum values of the audit committee meeting are 1 and 7 respectively, 
The result also indicates that Audit committee tenure (ACTE) has minimum and maximum value of 0 and 1 
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respectively since it is a dichotomous variable. The average value of the audit tenure is 0.53 and a standard 
deviation of 0.50.  The average value is an indication that more than 53% of the audit committee members stays 
for three years and above in the committee. The standard deviation shows that there is a close cluster of the 
variables around the mean. 
In addition, the audit committee share ownership shows an average value of .04 and a standard deviation 
of .12 indicating that there is a wide dispersion of the variable from the mean. The least value and the highest value 
of audit committee is 0 and .24 
The table also indicates that audit committee busyness has a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1, on 
average .7076 which is 70.76%. This suggest that on average more than 70% of the sampled  deposit money banks 
in Nigeria  hold more than one directorship. The standard deviation of .4565 also shows that this multiple 
directorship is a common practice among the sampled listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. 
In this section, the results of normality of the data,  multicollinearity test, heteroscedasticity test, hausman 
specification test, are presented and discussed, as shown in the table below as follows 
The normality individual data was test using Sharpiro wilks test at 5% level of significant. The results in the 
table 4 shows that DLLP, ACFEXP and ACSOW have significant p-value which suggest that the individual data 
is not normal distributed. Further the table shows that ACMEET, ACTE and ACBUSY are normal distributed 
evidence from their insignificant p-value. 
Table 4 
Normality test 
Variables  Obs W V Z Prob>z 
DLLP 130 0.76 24.46 7.19 0.00 
ACFEXP 130 0.82 17.68 6.47 0.00 
ACMEET 130 0.98 1.60 1.04 0.15 
ACTE 130 0.99 0.05 -6.87 1.00 
ACSOW 130 0.67 34.34 7.95 0.00 
ACBUSY 130 0.99 1.41 0.78 0.22 
Source: Sharpiro wilk test for normality result using STATA 13 
 
Multicollinearity Test      
Table 5 
Multicollinearity test 
Variable  VIF 1/VIF 
ACFEXP 1.09 0.91 
ACMEET 1.04 0.96 
ACTE 1.02 0.98 
ACSOW 1.04 0.96 
ACBUSY 1.04 0.96 
MEAN VIF 1.04  
Source: VIF result using STATA 13   
The classical assumption of OLS regression model assumes among others, that the error terms are normally 
distributed and independent (that is the error terms are uncorrelated); the explanatory variables are not perfectly 
correlated (absence of multicollinearity); and the variance of the error terms is constant (Homoskedastic). When 
these assumptions have not been met, the estimators are biased and cannot be used in drawing any inference. 
However, the results from Table 4.3 proved that there is no existence of excessive correlation among the 
independent variables, because the smallest tolerance value (TV) is 0.98, while the highest variance inflation factor 
(VIF) is 1.04. The rule of thumb for the Tolerance Value is that any value of 0.1 and below and the VIF value of 
10 and above imply the presence of multicollinearity in the estimates (Gujarati, 2004). 
Heteroscedasticity test was carried out to check the homoscedasticity assumption of a regression model. To 
test for the existence of heteroscedasticity, this study uses the Breusch- Pagan or cook – Weisberg. The result 
reveals that chi2 is 37.54 and the prob>chi2 is 0.0000 which is significant at 1% level of significance. This shows 
that there is presence of heteroscedasticity.  
Hausman specification test was conducted to choose the most appropriate model for the study. The result 
shows that at 5% level of significance, the chi2 is   10.65 and the prob>chi2 is 0.0589 which is insignificant. This 
insignificant p-value shows that Hausman test favors random effect model. Further the study carried out Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects to check if there is panel effect, that is, to choose between 
the random effect result and OLS regression. The result revealed a chi square of 70.72 and Prob > chibar2 is 0.0000 
indicating that there is a panel effect. Hence, the study interpreted the random effect model. 
In this section, the regression results of audit committee attribute variables and earnings management are 
presented and analyzed.  
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Table 6   
Random effect Regression Model 
Variable  Coefficients  Std error t-value p-value 
ACFEXP -.34 .06 -5.82 0.00 
ACMEET .00 .00 1.06 0.29 
ACTE -.00 .00 -0.99 0.32 
ACSOW .05 .03 1.41 0.16 
ACBUSY -.01 .00 -3.05 0.00 
CONSTANT .01 .01 1.25 0.21 
     
R2 overall  35.61    
f-statistic 64.79    
p-value 0.00    
Source: Random effect model result using STATA 13  
Table 6 presents random effect regression result selected for the study based on the hausman test.  The 
regression result reveals that the independent variables, audit committee characteristic variables (audit committee 
financial expertise, audit committee meeting, audit committee tenure, audit committee busyness and audit 
committee shareholder ownership) are able to explain up to 35.61% of the variations in the earnings management 
of the sampled listed deposit money banks while the remaining percentage is   explained by other factors not 
captured in the model. The F- statistics chi square is 64.79 with a p-value of 0.0000 which reveals that the model 
is fitted at 1% significant level. 
The hypotheses of the study were tested from the regression result presented in Table 6 
Hypotheses 1: audit committee expertise has no significance effect on earnings management of listed deposit 
money banks in Nigeria. 
The result from table 6 shows that audit committee financial expertise   has a significant negative impact on 
FRQ of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria as indicated by the coefficient of -.34 with P- value of 0.000 which 
is statistically significant at 1% level of significance. That is, audit committee expertise is significant in improving 
the Earnings Management of listed DMB’s firms in Nigeria. Based on this, the study rejects the null hypotheses 
hypothesis one (H01) which states that, audit committee financial expertise has no significance effect on Earnings 
Management of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. 
Hypotheses 2: audit committee meeting has no significance effect on earnings management of listed deposit 
money banks in Nigeria. 
On the contrary, the results from the table shows that the audit committee meeting (ACMEET) has a positive 
impact on FRQ of listed DMB’S in Nigeria, from the coefficient of .00  which is not significant at any levels of 
significance (p-value of 0.29). This suggests that audit committee meeting has no significant impact on earnings 
management of DMB’S in Nigeria during the period under study. Therefore, based on this evidence, the study 
fails to reject the null hypothesis two (H02) which states that audit committee meeting has no significance effect 
on earnings management of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. 
Hypotheses 3: audit committee tenure has no significance effect on earnings management of listed deposit 
money banks in Nigeria 
Similarly, the results from the table indicates that audit committee tenure (ACTE) has a negative and 
insignificant impact on FRQ of listed DMB’S in Nigeria, considering the coefficient of  .00 and p-value of 0.32. 
Thus, based on this statistical evidence, the study accepts the null hypothesis three (H03) which states that audit 
committee tenure has no significance effect on earnings management of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria 
Hypotheses 4: audit committee share ownership has no significance effect on earnings management of listed 
deposit money banks in Nigeria 
Table 6 shows a positive and insignificant relationship between audit committee share ownership and FRQ 
of listed DMB’S in Nigeria, This is evident from the coefficient of .05 and a p-value of 0.16. Based on this, the 
study therefore accepts the fourth null hypothesis (H04) which states that audit committee share ownership has no 
significance effect on earnings management of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria 
Hypotheses 5: audit committee busyness has no significance effect on earnings management of listed deposit 
money banks in Nigeria. 
Also the table 6 shows that audit committee busyness   has a significant negative impact on FRQ of listed 
deposit money banks in Nigeria as indicated by the   coefficient of -.01 with P- value of 0.00 which is statistically 
significant at 1% level of significance. This means that audit committee busyness is significant in improving the 
earnings management of listed DMB’s firms in Nigeria. Based on this, the study rejects the null hypotheses 
hypothesis five (H05) which states that, audit committee busyness has no significance effect on earnings 
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management of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. 
From the tests conducted on the data collected and the analyses of the results, this study found that audit 
committee characteristic is associated with earnings management of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. The 
result from the study reveals that audit committee financial expertise (ACFEXP) in the listed DMB’s in Nigeria 
has positive impact on the FRQ of the sampled firms.  This signifies that any increase in the financial expertise of 
the members of the audit committee will increase the discretionary loan loss provision thereby improve the 
earnings management of the banks.  This implies that audit committee financial expertise enhances the manner in 
which the audit committee evaluates the banks financial report.  It also suggests that expertise knowledge by the 
audit committee members helps to detect misstatement and reduces earnings management. This finding is 
consistent with findings of prior studies such as Mangena and Pike 2005; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; Baxter 
and Cotter 2009; Lin and Hwang 2010, Kusnadi, Leong Suwardy, and Wang (2014), etc. who found audit 
committee financial expertise too positively and significantly improve earnings management. The study is also 
contrary to the work of Onyabe, Okpanachi, Nyor, Yahaya, and Ahmed (2018). 
This study found that audit committee meeting has significant positive and insignificant impact on FRQ of 
listed DMB’s in Nigeria. This is evidence from the coefficient of .00 and p-value of 0.29 from table 6, this implies 
that an increase in the numbers of meeting held by the audit committee will have no impact on FRQ hence; earnings 
management is also not affected. This finding suggests that audit committee meeting does not influence 
management engagement earnings management practice in the sampled listed deposit money banks. This finding 
is in line with the work of Onyabe, Okpanachi, Nyor, Yahaya, and Ahmed (2018) who found audit committee 
meeting not to have influence on the quality of financial reporting. And it is also not consistent with the research 
work by Osarumwense and Aderemi (2016). 
The study also found that audit committee tenure has a negative and insignificant impact on FRQ of DMB’s 
in Nigeria.  The table 4.4 above shows that ACTE has a coefficient of -.00 and p-value of 0.32. This implies that 
whether there is an increase or decrease in audit committee tenure, the earnings management may not necessarily 
change either by increasing or decreasing. However, the finding collaborates with the view of Onyabe, Okpanachi, 
Nyor and Yahaya (2018) who state that audit committee tenure has not significant effect on earnings management. 
It also contradicts the findings of Adeyemi and Okpala (2011) and Okolie (2014) etc. who opinion that when the 
audit committee stay longer term, they may develop a close relationship with the management and impair 
independence which will eventually result in poor earnings management. 
Table 6 shows that audit committee share ownership has a coefficient of .05 and p-value of 0.16. This study 
found that audit committee share ownership has significant positive and insignificant impact on FRQ of listed 
DMB’s in Nigeria. This implies that the percentage of share owns by the non-executive directors on the audit 
committee has no influence on the quality of their financial reporting of the banks. This implies that whether there 
is an increase or decrease in their shareholdings, the earnings management may not necessarily change either by 
increasing or decreasing. 
The regression result from Table 6 also revealed that audit committee busyness has a t-value of -3.05, a 
coefficient of -.01 and a p-value equal to 0.003 which is significant at 1%. This means that audit committee meeting 
has a significant and a negative impact on discretionary loan loss provision. The  coefficient of -.01 means that as 
members of the audit committee are holding more than one directorship, there will be a decline in  discretionary 
loan loss provision thus, improving (increasing) the Earnings  Management of the listed deposit money banks in 
Nigeria. This further means multiple directorship influence the earnings management positively. This could result 
from the experience the gather from other others board where they are directing. The result signifies that although 
they may be busy with others directorship the wealth of experience they bring from other directorship goes a long 
way in improving their monitoring skills and also improving the earnings management of the deposit money banks 
in Nigeria. The findings is in line with the study by (Fama & Jenson, 1983; Shivdasani, 1993; Ferris et al., 2003; 
Carcello et al., 2002b; Bedard et al., 2004; Yang and Krishnan, 2005). They found a positive relationship and 
opinion that busy directors may be more able directors than their counterparts. It is also contrary to the study by 
Dhaliwal et al. (2010). 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
After careful review of the results and discussion, as well as relevant literatures, the study concludes that the audit 
committee financial expertise improves the earnings management of the DMB’s in Nigeria. It is also concluded 
that the numbers of meeting held by the audit committee members does not influence the earnings management of 
the banks. Further, it is concluded that the longer the tenure of the audit committee the does not have impact on 
the earnings management of the listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. The study also concludes that an increase 
or decrease in audit share ownership of listed Nigeria does not affect their earnings management deposit money 
banks in Nigeria. Finally the study concludes that audit committee busyness enhances the quality of financial 
report of the deposit money banks in Nigeria.  
In line with the findings and the conclusion of this study, the following recommendations made.  
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i) The board of directors of deposit money banks should be more inclined in engaging the services of 
members with financial expertise. This is because such committee member will be able to select and 
implement audit procedures that are precise and effective when delivering their service.  
ii) Further for more reliability of financial report, the study recommends that supervisory boards and 
regulators should encourage more inclusion of financial expertise members in the audit committee. 
iii) The study also recommends the inclusion of more directors with multiple directors on the audit 
committee as their wealth of experience helps reducing earnings management thus improving the 
earnings management of the banks. 
Further research may be needed to be conducted on the audit committee attributes in other sectors other 
than deposit money banks like industrial goods companies. 
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